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Abstract
Mitigating Differential Power Analysis Attacks on AES using NeuroMemristive
Hardware
Colin R. Donahue
Supervising Professor: Dhireesha Kudithipudi
Cryptographic algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are vulnera-
ble to side channel attacks. AES was once thought to be impervious to attacks, but this
proved to be true only for a mathematical model of AES, not a physical realization. Hard-
ware implementations leak side channel information such as power dissipation. One of the
practical SCA attacks is the Differential power analysis (DPA) attack, which statistically
analyzes power measurements to find data-dependent correlations.
Several countermeasures against DPA have been proposed at the circuit and logic level
in conventional technologies. These techniques generally include masking the data inside
the algorithm or hiding the power profile. Next generation processors bring in additional
challenges to mitigate DPA attacks, by way of heterogeneity of the devices used in the
hardware realizations. Neuromemristive systems hold potential in this domain and also
bring new challenges to the hardware security of cryptosystems.
In this exploratory work, a neuromemristive architecture was designed to compute an AES
transformation and mitigate DPA attacks. The random power profile of the neuromemris-
tive architecture reduces the correlations between data and power consumption. Hardware
primitives, such as neuron and synapse circuits were developed along with a framework to
generate neural networks in hardware.
An attack framework was developed to run DPA attacks using different leakage models.
A baseline AES cryptoprocessor using only CMOS technology was attacked successfully.
vi
The SubBytes transformation was replaced by a neuromemristive architecture, and the pro-
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The advent of side-channel attacks (SCAs) has caused increased focus on the security of
cryptosystems [21]. Although block ciphers such as AES were considered completely se-
cure in the past, this is no longer the case [35]. SCAs take an entirely different approach to
breaking security compared to traditional algebraic or brute-force attacks. The side channel
information emitted from an encryption is statistically analyzed along with plaintexts or ci-
phertexts in order to find the secret key. When implementing a cryptographic algorithm the
power consumption and execution time must be considered along with traditional security
parameters such as the key size and encryption mode.
Memristors are the fourth fundamental two terminal passive devices that were realized
as thin-film devices in 2008 [48]. Memristors can be used to model biological synapses
due to their unique properties [15]. Both synapses and memristors have a weight value
that can be changed according to a specific training method. The weight of a memristor
is represented by its resistance whereas a synapse has a synaptic weight whose strength
is controlled by biological parameters. Previously, artificial neural networks have been
designed in hardware using both digital and analog techniques. Synapse circuits that use
memristors to store weight values have the potential to be more power and area efficient
than previous designs which require registers to hold weight values. The focus of this thesis
is on using neuromemristive hardware to increase security against a type of side channel
attack called differential power analysis (DPA).
There are two main characteristics of neuromorphic architectures that make them a good
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candidate for mitigating DPA attacks. The first is that the computation in neural networks is
executed in the analog domain by the neurons and synapses in the system. This introduces
power fluctuations on the intermediate nodes in the network that appear to be random.
In an overdetermined network some neurons will be unnecessary and their output will be
unrelated to the overall output of the network. The increased noise level renders attacks
that rely on power consumption correlation less effective. The second characteristic is
that retraining a network also changes all the synapse weights in the system which in turn
changes the power signature of the network. This implies that the power signature of the
algorithm can be changed even when the secret key remains the same.
Numerous DPA attacks have been mounted on FPGAs [28, 42, 23, 11] and smart cards
[30, 26]. The susceptibility of hardware implementations to DPA has been investigated
thoroughly since Kocher’s seminal paper on SCAs [21]. Countermeasures against DPA
have also been explored and mainly include masking and hiding the power consump-
tion.
Masking adds or multiplies random numbers to an algorithm’s input and intermediate val-
ues in order to conceal the computation on the actual values [9]. Masking the critical parts
of AES can be difficult [36]. Hiding the algorithm’s power profile is another approach to
countering DPA. Hiding can be performed either by smoothing the power profile so that
every operation uses the same amount of power, or randomizing the power so that the
computations appear unrelated to the power consumption. Almost all of the previously
proposed techniques use traditional CMOS architectures to protect against DPA.
The eventual advent of memristive devices in the commercial market calls for an investiga-
tion into how these devices can be used to increase cryptographic security. The security of
cryptosystems is of utmost importance in financial and defense applications. Memristive
devices open up new avenues in hardware design and this work explores how those avenues
can lead to advances in hardware security that are not possible with current conventional
designs.
3
Chapter 2 gives background information about AES, SCAs, memristors, and neuromor-
phic designs. Chapter 3 discusses related work in SCA prevention and neuromorphic ar-
chitectures. Chapter 4 describes both the AES architecture and neuromemristive design.
Chapter 5 describes the framework for simulating the designs and running attacks. Chapter
6 presents and analyzes the results. Chapter 7 contains concluding remarks and areas for
future work.
1.1 Contributions
• Developed fundamental neural network hardware building blocks in SPICE.
• Designed a framework for generating neural networks in software and synthesize in
to hardware.
• Implemented two neuromemristive architectures that perform an AES transformation.





This chapter gives an overview of several key components in this work. Background infor-
mation is given on AES, SCAs, memristors, and neuromorphic architectures. AES is the
target algorithm that was implemented using a neuromemristive architecture. AES was at-
tacked using SCAs, in particular DPA. Memristors are one of the primary components of a
neuromemristive architecture and used to represent synapses. A neuromorphic architecure
was developed in hardware to perform one of the transformations in AES.
2.1 Advanced Encryption System
The Rijndael block cipher was proposed as an Advanced Encryption Standard candidate by
Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. It was accepted as a standard by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology in 2001 and is now known simply as AES. AES was designed for
simplicity, speed, and code compactness and is made up of three invertible transformations
[10]. The layers of AES are the linear mixing layer, non-linear layer, and key addition
layer. The algorithm consists of several rounds acting on the intermediate result known as
the state. In the Rijndael algorithm, the state can be 128, 192 or 256 bits. The key size
can also be 128, 192, or 256 bits. However, when the AES standard was created the size of
the state was limited to 128 bits. AES can be used for message authentication and hashing
along with its more standard use case of a symmetric key algorithm.
The state can be thought of as a rectangular array of bytes with four rows. The number of
columns depend on the state size being operated on. Fig. 2.1 shows an example encryption.
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The plaintext and key are simply increasing numbers while the ciphertext appears to be
completely unrelated.
00 01 02 03
04 05 06 07
08 09 0a 0b
0c 0d 0e 0f
00 01 02 03
04 05 06 07
08 09 0a 0b
0c 0d 0e 0f
a1 e4 04 96
63 ac 60 6b
7e a9 13 f4
db f6 03 dd
plaintext key ciphertext
f(  , )  =
Figure 2.1: Example AES operation. An input plaintext and key yield a ciphertext.
The AES algorithm consists of 10 rounds when a 128-bit key is used. In each round there
are four transformations applied to the state. The first transformation is SubBytes which is
the only non-linear function and simply exchanges each byte in the state with another byte.
The substitution is defined by finding the multiplicative inverse of the byte in the Galois
FieldGF (28). After the multiplicative inverse is found then an affine transformation on the
byte is performed. These two transformations can be computed algorithmically every time
a substitution is needed or the entire substitution box (S-box) can be stored as a lookup
table in memory. In many software implementations the S-box is implemented as a lookup
table since system cache is generally large enough to contain the whole table. There are
only 256 possible byte values that can be substituted so only 256 bytes of memory are
required. The entire S-box can be stored many times over in cache even in an old processor
such as a Pentium I which has 8192 bytes of L1 cache [4].
The next transformation is ShiftRows which shifts each row of the state over by a certain
number of bytes and is part of the linear mixing layer. An illustration of this is shown in
Fig. 2.2. If the total block length is 128 or 192 bits C(1) = 1, C(2) = 2 and C(3) = 3. If
the block length is 256 bits then C(3) = 4. The first row of the state remains unchanged
for all cases. The remaining rows are rotated to the left by 1, 2 and 3 bytes. The third
transformation in the linear mixing layer is MixColumns. MixColumns operates on each
column of the state and can be expressed as a matrix multiplication or an XOR operation
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with a fixed polynomial. The fixed polynomial multiplication is shown in Eq. 2.1. The
order of the polynomial must be kept below 4, so the result of the multiplication is taken
modulo x4 + 1. An illustration of this is shown in Fig. 2.3. Each byte a in the original state
is XOR’d with a polynomial value in c.
b(x) = (0h03x3 + x2 + x+ 0h02)× a(x) (mod x4 + 1) (2.1)
Figure 2.2: ShiftRow on the state [10]
Figure 2.3: MixColumn on the state [10]
The final transformation is the round key addition. Each round of the algorithm has a
different round key which is based off the secret key and produced by the key schedule.
This transformation simply does a bitwise XOR between the round key and state. An
illustration of this is shown in Fig. 2.4.
Figure 2.4: AddRoundKey on the state [10]
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Each round executes these four transformations with the exception of the last round, which
does not execute MixColumns. The number of rounds depends on the key size and the
block length. The number of rounds varies between 10 and 14. The key size can be 128,
192 or 256 bits. All of these key sizes are currently infeasible to guess using a brute
force attack. Assuming an attacker had access to a supercomputer with 100 petaflops of
computing power and each encryption took 1000 operations, 1 billion encryptions could be
performed per second. Even with that speed, roughly 5 × 1018 years would be needed for
a brute force attack.
AES has also been found to be resistant to both linear and differential cryptanalysis as long
as at least 4 rounds are used [10]. Thus far, the best attack that recovers the full key is
the Biclique cryptanalysis [5]. This analysis still is only four times faster than a regular
brute force with a computational complexity of 2126.1 for 128-bit keys. Even this small
reduction only works on the first 7 rounds of an encryption, not the full 10. However, many
implementations of AES are susceptible to side channel attacks.
2.2 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks (SCAs) are a unique way of attacking crytographic algorithms in that
they do not attack the mathematics of the algorithm. Instead side channel attacks focus on
the implementation of algorithms and how they affect the state of objects around them. Tra-
ditional cryptographic side channel attacks were first demonstrated by Kocher in 1999 [21].
The first known usage of side channel attacks occured in 1965 [51]. British intelligence of-
ficers were able to detect the state of an Egyptian roto-cipher by placing a microphone next
to it and listening to the clicks it produced when reset. This allowed the attackers to deter-
mine a portion of the secret key without having plaintexts or ciphertexts. Today, there are
several forms of SCAs that use timing or power information. The focus of this work is on
power attacks.
Both software and hardware implementations of AES leak information that can lead to the
secret key. In software implementations the system cache contains information relating to
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the instructions to be executed as well as parts of the S-box. If an attacker is able to run a
process in a system it is possible to extract information about cache acceses. Tracing the
cache accesses with a malignant process gives an attacker information about the data being
used in an algorithm as well as the instruction sequence. A malignant process is not always
required, sometimes just timing information is sufficient to determine when there was a
cache hit or miss. In a hardware implementation of AES the power trace of the circuit
can be analyzed. If there are more bits flipped in an operation the current drawn in the
system will increase. Similarly, the circuit will consume more power during certain stages
of the algorithm and each round of the algorithm can be identified by observing the power
trace.
The simplest form of power attacks is Simple Power analysis (SPA). SPA directly analyzes
the power consumption of a single execution of a cryptographic operation. The details
of encryption algorithms such as DES and AES are fully exposed to the public so an at-
tacker always knows the steps in the algorithm. Oftentimes these implementations are
open-sourced as in the case of the popular program OpenSSL [46]. For example, precise
current traces of an algorithm can be extracted and show if a branch in code was taken or
not taken. This means algorithms where the execution path is data dependent can be easily
broken with SPA. However, in most cases the small variation in power consumption is not
enough to discover the exact instruction path in hardware implementations. Countermea-
sures against SPA are also quite simple, the implementation should avoid using branches
that depend on keys. This approach can incur significant penalties [29].
DPA uses a different approach. Rather than trying to trace a single execution path, DPA
analyzes the effects of different data values being used [20]. For example, in the case of
AES the LSB of the S-Box output can be analyzed to see how the power consumption
changes for different values. An example distribution of the power consumption taken
from 10000 execution traces for AES with the same key but different plaintexts is shown
in Fig. 2.5. In this example the instantaneous power was taken at the point in time where
the LSB of the state was looked up in the S-Box. It is clear that the power consumption
of the circuit has a gaussian distribution and there are not obvious discrete sections of
9
the plot which correspond to unique byte values. In a real system it is not possible to
know exactly when a particular operation is occuring. An attacker would instead have
to gather power consumption values for an entire execution trace and run many different
analyses. Choosing the exact time to look at the power in simulation is much easier since
the algorithm is a white box, and gives an idea of what the attacker can do in the best-case
situation.



















Figure 2.5: Distribution of power consumption over 10000 traces
When gathering power consumption data the attacker also has to keep track of the input
plaintexts for each trace. This allows partitioning of the traces based on what data was
used in a particular execution. After separating out the traces based on whether the LSB
output was a 0 or 1 the distribution in Fig. 2.6 was found. This separation can only be
done correctly if the key guess is correct. The average value of these two distributions are
noticeably different which implies there is some statistical correlation between the LSB
output and the power consumption. Also note that since the two distributions still overlap
it would not be possible to predict the output value with only a single measurement or even
a few hundred measurements. Hence, obtaining a large number of datapoints is necessary
for DPA.
10





















Figure 2.6: Distribution of Power Consumption separated into 0 and 1 outputs with a correct key
guess.
When an incorrect key guess is made and the traces are sorted in the same way the distri-
butions look very similar. This can be seen in Fig. 2.7. In this case the average value of
each distribution is nearly identical.
A DPA attack on AES focuses on one of two stages in the algorithm. It is assumed the
attacker has access to either the plaintext or ciphertext of every execution. If the attacker
has access to the plaintext, then the S-box substitution in the first round of execution is
analyzed. This is because at that time the plaintext has only been exclusive or’d with the
key and is then put through the S-box. After the first round, the plaintext has already been
obscured and the attacker cannot determine the input to the S-box. If only the ciphertext
is known, then the S-box substitution in the final round of execution can be attacked in a
similar fashion.
Regardless of whether a plaintext or ciphertext attack is performed, a selection function
must be chosen. This selection function is of the formD(P,K, b). P is the plaintext/ciphertext
value, K is the key guess, and b are the target bits. When these inputs are supplied the se-
lection function produces a ’0’ or ’1’ output. If the evaluation of P and K causes a change
11





















Figure 2.7: Distribution of Power Consumption separated into 0 and 1 outputs with an incorrect key
guess.
above some threshold t in b then D(P,K, b) = 1. Otherwise, if the change is below that t,
D(P,K, b) = 0.
The value of the threshold t depends partially on the leakage model that is used to predict
the power consumption. The two most popular models are Hamming Distance and Ham-
ming Weight. The Hamming Weight model assumes that a system will consume different
amounts of power when an output bit is logic ’1’ compared to when it is logic ’0’. This
model puts more importance on static power consumption. Therefore if eight bits were
being attacked there would be nine possible Hamming Weights. If the S-box output was
predicted to be 01101100 for a particular key guess, the Hamming Weight would be 4 or
HW (01101100) = 4. If t = 5, D(P,K, b) = 0. If t = 3, D(P,K, b) = 1.
Hamming Distance is slightly more complicated since it assumes that if more bits are
switching, more power is consumed. This model places more importance on dynamic
power consumption. The Hamming Distance model therefore needs to know what an out-
put changed from, not just what it was at a certain point in time. For example, if it was
guessed that an output transitioned from 10110111 to 01101100, the Hamming Distance
12
would be 6. A quick way to evaluate Hamming Distance is to XOR the two values together
and find the Hamming Weight, orHW (On−1⊕On). Once again the selection function will
evaluate to different results depending on t.
To perform the attack power traces must be gathered along with the corresponding input
values to the algorithm. The input values are randomly generated to ensure a wide variety
of power traces. For each power trace that is gathered the selection function is evaluated
and sorted into either the A1 bin or the A0 bin. If the key guess is incorrect the traces will
be sorted into the correct bins with a probability of one-half. This is because although the
key guess be far off the actual key, there are only two possible bins to sort into. Even with
a random guess the chance of being in the right bin is 50%.
If the key guess is correct the traces will be sorted into the correct bin with a probability
closer to one, depending on the threshold chosen. An intelligent attacker will use several
different thresholds to see which is the most effective for a particular implementation. The
averages of all traces in A1 and all the traces in A0 is then computed. The difference be-
tween these two averages will be highest when the key is guessed correctly. This is because
there is a correlation between the data and power consumption of an algorithm. If the key
guess is incorrect there will be a very small difference between the two averages because
the traces are essentially sorted pseudorandomly. When attacking AES usually eights bits
are guessed at a time so there will be a total of 256 different key guesses. Guessing eight
bits at once means there are multiple possible thresholds, and larger differences between
averages. When guessing the key a byte at a time, 16 correct guesses need to be made.
Even if it is not possible to guesses every byte, each correct guess reduces the search space
for the whole key by a factor of 28.
AES is vulnerable to DPA any time the power consumption of the system is dependent on
a known value and the round key. Any output of a transformation in AES is vulnerable to
such an attack except for ShiftRows. ShiftRows doesn’t actually perform any logic and can
be performed using only wiring. Non-linear transformations can be attacked much more
efficiently than linear transformations [20]. Therefore, the ideal transformation to attack is
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SubBytes as it is the only one that is non-linear.
Prevention of DPA involves reducing the signal to noise ratio so an attacker gains less in-
formation with each sample. One way of reducing this ratio is to randomly generate noise
which masks the actual power consumption of the algorithm. An alternative to that tech-
nique is to ensure every operation uses the same amount of power by balancing Hamming
Weights. If the operations are perfectly balanced every encryption would have the same
power consumption so an attacker would not be able to differentiate between encryptions
regardless of how many samples are taken.
The goal of these countermeasures are to force the attacker to gather more samples until
the amount needed is beyond what is feasible. DPA requires the same key to be used for
all measurements so the number of measurements needed has to be less than the number of
times a key is used before it is discarded. All of these countermeasures will introduce some
degree of performance degradation due to area overhead, speed or power consumed. Lever-
aging the small size and power consumption of memristors in neuromemristive hardware
will minimize the performance costs while still delivering secure computation.
2.3 Memristors
Memristors were first theorized in 1971 by Leon Chua [7]. The well known passive two-
terminal circuit elements are the resistor, capacitor and inductor. Memristors are one of the
fundamental elements and form a relationship between charge and magnetic flux. Equation
2.2 is the differential equation showing how the change of the magnetic flux linkage and
charge depend on the memristance state. Taking an integral with respect to time yields











A functioning thin-film memristor was fabricated in 2008 by HP Labs [44]. The memristor
was made out of a titanium dioxide film and has since been fabricated using several ferro-
electric materials [6] [17]. There have also been several variations of memristors, such as
spin memristive systems which control the spin of electrons [33] and polymeric memristors
[13].
The exact definition of memristors is hotly debated, but a common feature is their pinched
hysteresis curve. Chua succinctly stated ”If it’s pinched it’s a memristor” [8]. The resis-
tance level of a memristor can be changed by applying a write voltage to its terminals.
Depending on the type of the memristor this resistance behaves in different ways. By the
pure definition of a memristor the resistance should always be changing whenever the ap-
plied voltage changes. In fabricated devices it takes a sustained voltage above some write
threshold to change the resistance of the device [44]. The behavior of fabricated devices
is quite useful since the memristors are non-volatile and keep their state when the system
using them is powered down. Their resistances can also be read without actually changing
the resistance at the same time by applying a read voltage below the write threshold. This
means a memristor can be used as a memory device or even as a synapse. The pinched
hysteresis curve of a titanium dioxide memristor is shown in Fig. 2.8. This memristor was
simulated in SPICE using a model published by Yakopcic et al. [50].
The slope of the straight parts of the curve correspond to two different resistances of the
memristor. Once the input voltage goes above the threshold of the memristor (1.088V) it
enters a non-linear region where the resistance changes. As can be seen in the Fig. 2.8, the
rate at which the resistance changes can be different depending on whether it is increasing
or decreasing. In this particular model, the resistance increases faster than it decreases, so
the resistance change when a negative voltage is supplied is larger. These differences do
not affect the operation of the memristors when voltages are below the threshold, which is
how they are used in this work.
15
Figure 2.8: Pinched hysteresis curve
One of the current limitations of memristors is that their fabrication is not yet a reliable
process. Integrating memristors with CMOS logic also poses new design challenges. In
2012 researchers at the University of Michigan and HRL Laboratories [18] were able to
fabricate a memristor/CMOS system that stored a bitmap image. The memristor array was
part of a vertical layer that sat above the CMOS control logic.
The advent of memristors allows for the design of architectures previously infeasible in
hardware. The similarity between memristors and synapses opens up the possibility of new
neuromorphic computing paradigms in hardware. In a brain, neurons are connected to other
neurons by synapses which vary in strength. A stronger connection (in the case of electrical
synapses) means that more current will pass through and cause a greater voltage change in
the next neuron. A memristor with a high conductance value mimics a stronger connection.
Memristors can also be placed compactly and consume little power which gives hope that
neuromorphic architectures will be able to give the same performance as CMOS in certain
applications while consuming less energy and with a lower area cost.
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2.4 Neuromorphic Architectures
2.4.1 Neural Network Basics
Artificial neural networks are biologically inspired designs that are capable of doing com-
putation in a unique way. Traditionally computers are designed using the Von-Neumann
architecture which has registers, a program counter, memory, and an arithmetic logic unit.
One of the primary problems in Von-Neumann architectures is that there is often a memory
bottleneck for high performance computing applications. Neural networks differ from tra-
ditional architectures since they are modeled to be similar to a biological brain and contain
two fundamental building blocks: neurons and synapses. Neurons are connected to each
other by synapses and each synapse has a weight associated with it. Each neuron also has
an activation function which is activated when the summation of all the input weights is
above a certain threshold.
The way neurons and synapses interact is described by Equation 2.4. The output of a
neuron is y. The input contributions from other neurons are xi and the corresponding
weight connection between neurons is wi. An additional bias value b is often included to





wixi + b) (2.4)
There are three main classifications of neural networks: multilayered, single-layered and
recurrent [24]. The neurons in the multilayer networks are only connected to neurons
outside their layer. An example multilayer perceptron network architecture is shown in
Fig. 2.9. A network with more hidden layers and neurons will be able to perform complex
functions with greater accuracy.
A recurrent network contains connections from the outputs to the inputs. Fig. 2.10 shows








Figure 2.9: Multilayer Perceptron Network. Each neuron is connected to every neuron in the sub-
sequent layer.
network. Hopfield networks can be used as associative memory and image classification
and consist of only a single layer where every neuron is connected to every other neuron.
The main advantage of recurrent networks is that they can be trained to perform functions
on time-varying inputs. They also are designed to more closely approximate the capabilites
of a biological brain which has a large number of recurrent connections. Networks such as
Echo-State Networks and Liquid State machines are able to perform tasks such as image
recognition and audio processing on time-varying data.
In general, neural networks are naturally good at operations with large degrees of paral-
lelism, systems with large numbers of inputs and outputs, and when little is known about
how a system should be designed other than inputs and outputs. An important consideration
when using neural networks is how to train them. The selection and size of training data
greatly affects how fast a network can be trained. Similarly the initial weights of synapses
can lead to different training results. Knowing when to stop training can either be decided











Figure 2.10: Recurrent Network. Each neuron is connected to every neuron in the subsequent layer.
The outputs are fed back into the network with a delay parameter. This allows the network to process
temporal data.
stop changing in a way that affects the output. The exact time to stop training is some-
what subjective and varies from application to application. Designing the size of a network
tends to be a trial and error process and the size needed can not be predicted until several
performance tests are done for different sizes of networks.
2.4.2 Network Training
The goal of training a neural network is to reduce some cost function associated with it. In
this work, the cost function is the overall accuracy of the network at approximating an AES
transformation. The smaller the cost, the more accurate the transformation. In particular,
the mean squared error between the network and expected outputs is found. The training
method used is supervised, which means sets of inputs and outputs are presented to the
network and it tries to infer a function between them.
In most cases, an important aspect of a neural network is its ability to generalize a function
so that it can respond well to previously unseen inputs. Input data for training is often
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divided into training and testing sets. Training data is used to train the network, and testing
data is used to ensure the network will generalize well. For example, a neural network
that differentiates between male and female faces shouldn’t fail just because it sees a new
face. Therefore, it is often important not to overtrain a network and see patterns that do
not necessarily exist for all possible inputs. Fig. 2.11 shows an example what can happen





Figure 2.11: Effects of overtraining a neural network.
In this case, a linear approximation of the input would yield good accuracy results for
both training and testing data. A higher order function is able to have better performance
for just the training data, but when the testing data is added in the performance is much
worse.
In this work, it is better to overtrain the network. This is because the inputs to the network
are binary and every possible input is known ahead of time. Most importantly, there is not a
prohibitively large amount of possible inputs so every one can be presented to the network
for training in a reasonable amount of time. A network training to differentiate between
human male and female faces could be presented the face of every human, but it would take
an incredibly long time to train.
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Gradient descent methods are often used to minimize the cost function of a neural network.
The gradient descent method works by continually moving in the direction of the negative
gradient. Eq. 2.5 shows how x would be updated to find a minimum of f(x).
xnew = xold − εf ′(xold) (2.5)
This method is not guaranteed to find a global minimum for all functions. It is not even
guaranteed to find a local minimum for all functions, and has very poor convergence speed
as it approaches a minimum. One feature that helps with overall convergence speed is the
ε term. A larger epsilon term will make the convergence speed faster but it may pass over
some local minima due to having a large step size. Oftentimes ε is changed dynamically
during training depending on how close to the target performance the algorithm is.
The more specific delta rule can be derived from the idea of gradient descent and is shown
in Eq. 2.6.




This equation governs how the ith input to the jth neuron changes. tj is the target output
of the neuron. f(x) is the activation function of the neuron, and yj = f(
∑
iwijxi which is
the output of the jth neuron. wij is the weigth between the jth neuron and ith input to that
neuron. ε is the learning rate and controls how fast the weight will change.
The delta rule can be used as-is for a single layer network. For a network with multiple
layers it has to be extended using a method called backpropagation. Backpropagation first
evaluates the whole network for a particular input sequence, then applies the delta rule for
the output layer, the next to last layer, and so on until it reaches the first layer. This is then
repeated until the desired accuracy is acheived. Since it is a simple gradient descent method
it does not guarantee convergence to a global mininum and can converge slowly.
21
The method used for training in this work is Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. This algo-
rithm uses an iterative method similar to backpropagation, but has an additional damping
factor that gives fast convergence even when the error gradient is small. Eq. shows the
algorithm which must be solved for the new change in parameter vector δ. After each
iteration the parameter vector β is updated to β + δ.
(JTJ + λdiag(JTJ))δ = JT [y − f(x, β)] (2.7)
In this equation f is also a vector with entries f(xi, β) where each xi is an input to the
overall neural network function and β contains all the parameters (weights). y is a vector




. The damping factor λ starts out small when beginning training since it is
assumed the parameters are far from the minimum error. If the parameter update yields a
smaller error, then λ is reduced more for the next iteration. If the new parameters result
in a higher error, the iteration is repeated with an increased λ. The Levenberg-Marquardt
algorithm can be stopped when λ is so large that further iterations have no substantial effect
on the error.
Neural networks can be trained to emulate the various AES transformations. Non-linear
transformations in AES such as SubBytes will require a feedforward neural network with
a sigmoid activation function. Simpler transformations such as ShiftRows do not even
require CMOS logic so using a neural network would induce unnecessary overhead. Neural
networks are often used with analog inputs, whereas AES uses only binary inputs and
outputs. This means the outputs of the trained network do not need to exactly equal ’0’ and
’1’. Outputs larger than 0.5 can be classified ’1’ which reduces the required accuracy of the
training algorithm. However, every single output needs to be classified correctly for every
input, since a single incorrect bit will propagate through the entire algorithm and make the
final output completely unrecognizable.
Retraining a network also changes its synaptic weights which will give it a different power
signature even if the same key is used. Changing the power signature of a system will make
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Since the advent of SCAs on AES there have been many proposals to mitigate their ef-
fectiveness. There have been no attempts so far to create countermeasures using a neu-
romemristive architecture. Neural networks have been used in cryptographic schemes but
not in the context of preventing side-channel attacks. A number of neural network designs
in hardware using memristors have also been proposed.
3.1 Neuromemristive Designs
Rose et al. [37] explored using memristors to make low-power neuromorphic hardware.
A subthreshold CMOS-memristor circuit was developed that used energy on the order of
femtojoules. However, the delay of the circuit was quite long, about 500 µs. The network
was also not trained to perform a specific task.
Adhikari et al. used a memristor bridge synapse to develop a hardware neural network ca-
pable of computing 3-bit parity and recognizing cars in an image [1]. The synapse design
used four memristors and could have both positive and negative weight values. Learning
methods were also explored and a multilayer network was trained by training each layer
separately. The performance of the trained hardware network was similar to that of a soft-
ware network. The architecture was designed to reduce power consumption by using a
pulse based technique so it didn’t have to use a large number of input terminals. This de-
sign did not use a truely sigmoidal activation function so it cannot be trained to perform the
S-Box transformation. Ebong et al. compared CMOS and memristor MOS technologies
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in neural network applications based on power usage, area and SNR tolerance [12]. They
found that the memristor based network was better in each category.
Yakopcic et al. presented a segmented memristor crossbar array that performed pattern
recognition [49]. The crossbar was segmented to improve the energy efficiency of the
design and reduce unwanted current paths. The system used one memristor per synapse
and was therefore unable to use negative weights.
3.2 Neural Networks in Cryptography
Noughabi and Sadeghiyan [27] explored the potential of using neural networks to generate
secure substitution boxes. They found that recurrent neural networks were able to fulfill
some of the important properties of substitution boxes such as non-linearity, completeness
and strict avalanche. They also attempted to match the AES S-Box but were not success-
ful.
The primary use of neural networks in cryptography has been for a public key exchange
protocol [38]. In this use case two neural networks are initialized with randomly chosen
uncorrelated weights. The networks are then synchronized with one another by receiving
common input values, transferring their output values to one another, and then updating
their weights. Two networks actively synchronizing with one another will converge to
the same output faster than another network listening to the communication. Increasing
the synaptic weight range available increases the security of the algorithm. Three meth-
ods have been developed to attack a neural cryptography scheme: geometric, genetic, and
probabalistic [19]. However, the computational complexity of each attack rises faster than
the complexity of the protocol when the synaptic weight range is increased. Therefore, the
attacks have a small chance of success when a proper weight range is chosen.
Stottinger et al. implemented a lightweight neural cryptography scheme and tested the ef-
fectiveness of side channel attacks against it [43]. Their implementation did not include
any memristors. Instead it used a tree parity machine with components like multiplexers
25
and adders. It was found that the scheme was resistant against DPA and became more re-
sistant when more internal nodes were added. The system was not completely invulnerable
against side channel attacks but it made practical attacks expensive. Their cryptographic
scheme also did not have any non-linear functions such as a substitution box which would
make it more vulnerable to DPA attacks.
3.3 DPA Countermeasures
3.3.1 Masking
The tower field method uses both additive and multiplicative masks and performs the S-
Box inversion operation in GF (22) [31]. This was implemented in hardware and found
to increase the critical path of the circuit by five times and also increase the area by about
1.5 times. The table re-computation method uses boolean and arithmetic masks along
with a masked lookup table [25]. This approach led to a two-fold increase in the number of
execution cycles. The masking techique proposed by Matthieu et al. [36] can provably stop
higher-order DPA in software. Their technique was slower than the table re-computation
method and the tower field method for first-order protection. The number of cycles needed
for an unmasked implementation was 3 × 103 and this increased to 129 × 103. However,
for protecting against higher-order DPA their technique was more efficient in terms of code
size and execution cycles.
3.3.2 Hiding
One technique used to completely level a circuit’s power consumption is dual rail logic
[14, 34]. Guilley et al. [14] used wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL), the goal of
which is to duplicate a netlist into two parts whose transitions are the opposite of one
another. Naturally this approach will double the hardware area since an entire copy of the
circuit must be made. The WDDL technique was experimentally tested using FPGAs and
found to be effective against DPA but the authors suspect that a more sensitive measurement
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platform could still mount a successful attack.
Popp et al. [34] proposed the use of masked dual-rail precharge logic (MDPL). This ap-
proach avoids the requirement of perfectly balancing the capacitive complementary wires.
It accomplishes this feat by masking every value and precharging cells. However, the
area of basic cells such NAND and NOR increase by a factor of 4. MDPL was found to
have higher energy and area costs as well as slower execution time than approaches such
as WDDL. However, it was found to improve DPA resistance without requiring perfectly
balanced wires.
A method of power randomization was proposed by Ambrose et al. which injected ran-
dom code into cryptographic algorithms [3]. Critical blocks in the code which contained
cryptographic operations are identified and when these blocks are executed instructions are
called which write to random registers. This technique caused an average runtime increase
of almost 30% and a 27.1% increase in energy consumption.
An asynchronous, low power substitution box was developed by Wu et al. [47]. The
hardware was synthesized onto an FPGA and found to be resistant to DPA. The S-Box was
designed with a special self-timing logic with no clock and monotonic transitions. The
implementation had lower power consumption than a synchronous equivalent.
An AES implementation that used dual-memories to create a uniform power signature dur-
ing encryption was proposed by Khedkar [16]. The implementation was tested by using
both CMOS and RRAM dual memories. It was resistant to DPA even after 40,000 power
measurements and the RRAM architecture consumed less than half the average power as
the CMOS architecture.
3.4 Summary
Overall, there have been forays into using neural networks for cryptography but they tend
to be less effective than traditional implementations. This is largely due to the fact that
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neural networks must be simulated in software on a Von-Neumann machine which is inher-
ently inefficient or designed using large of amounts digital logic. The proposed design uses
memristors to model a neural network in analog which is a more natural fit. DPA counter-
measures also explicitly add extra masking or hiding hardware whereas a neural network
implementation includes randomness that hides the power signature by default.
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Chapter 4
Proposed AES Neuromemristive Architecture
This chapter presents an overview of the hardware components which combine together to
form the entire architecture. The primary building blocks of an AES implementation are
shown in Fig. 4.1. The control unit is a state machine which determines where memory
should be read from and written to as well as which transformations should be performed.
The key memory stores the secret key value and can also store the expanded round keys.
The RAM can store plaintexts, ciphertexts, and intermediated values.
In this work the only transformation that was modified was SubBytes. In the reference
implementation all the blocks were designed using traditional CMOS logic. The new Sub-









Figure 4.1: The basic hardware blocks of an AES implementation.
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A neural network in hardware has two primary building blocks: neurons and synapses. Fig.
4.2 shows how the blocks are connected. Each neuron is connected to many output synapses
which are then connected to another neuron. The number of layers and neurons per layer









Figure 4.2: The basic hardware blocks of a neural network.
4.1 Neuron Design
The neuron in a neural network has to perform two operations. First, it must sum all of
the input contributions from incoming synapses. Then it must apply an activation function
to that input and produce an output. In the neuron design the summing is performed by
a differential amplifier and the activation function is computed using a differential pair of
transistors.
The ideal behavior of the summing circuit would take the positive and negative contribu-
tions from synapses (V+ and V−) and find the difference and ouput that voltage (Vout). This
is shown in Eq. 4.1. Fig. 4.3 shows the circuit for a differential amplifer. This circuit’s
behavior is governed by Eq. 4.2 and can be simplified as shown in Eq. 4.3 where A is the
gain. As long as the gain is limited to 1 then Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.3 are equivalent.


























Figure 4.3: Basic differential amplifier using an op-amp
The activation function is computed by the circuit shown in Fig. 4.4. It is essentially
a differential pair that is able to have an input between Vdd and Vss. The output ports
V+ and V− are both used by the synapse circuit and allow the output of the neuron to be






Figure 4.4: A differential pair of transistors that approximates the tanh function
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4.2 Synapse Design
The synapses mirror current from the neuron activation function outputs. The neuron and
synapse are designed in such a way that the output current to the synapse ranges from IB
to −IB. When Vin = Vdd in the neuron circuit IB flows through the left branch of the
differential pair. This is then mirrored over to the synapse circuit and multiplied by a factor
of 2 because of the double size transistor on the synapse. IB is also mirrored to Vin− on
the synapse so the summed current is equal to 2IB − IB = IB. In the opposite case where
Vin = Vss the summed current in the synapse is 0IB−IB = −IB. In the general case where
Ix is flowing through the left branch of the neuron the summed current is 2Ix − IB.
After the current is summed it then branches depending on the values of the two memris-
tors M+ and M−. When M+ is at its highest conductance value and M− is at its lowest
conductance value the synapse has a value of almost +1 since nearly all the current will
flow through M+. In the opposite case where M− is at its lowest conductance value and
M+ is at its highest the synapse has a value of −1.
A SPICE memristor model [50] was used to test the synapse circuit. The model was fitted
to experimental data found by Lu et al. [22]. This memristor has a positive write thresh-










Figure 4.5: The synapse circuit where the weight is controlled by the memristors M+ and M−.
The synapse, differential amplifier, and differential pair are then connected together as
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shown in Fig. 4.6. Resistors are needed between the synapses and differential amplifier
to convert the current output of the synapses to a voltage. Mutiple synapses can be con-
nected to one differential amplifier and share the same load resistors. The two outputs of
the differential pair are connected to the inputs of the synapses in the next layer of the
network.












Figure 4.6: The connections made between neural network building block circuits.
4.3 S-Box Design
The S-box function was built using a neural network consisting of the components pre-
sented in sections 4.1 and 4.2. The S-box function has eight binary inputs and eight binary
outputs. The true difficulty in training a neural network to compute this function is that it
has to be accurate for every single input combination, of which there are 28 = 256.
In order to make the training process both faster and parallelizable eight separate networks
were used, one for each output. In addition, the security of the function depends on hav-
ing what seems to be random power consumption. If the user desires the system to be
retrained only a single, smaller network needs to be retrained rather than an entire large
network. If the user wants retraining to be done between every encryption then the down-
time between encryptions will be lower if only an eighth of the S-box function needs to be
retrained.
The size of network is larger than what is needed in software for several reasons. In hard-
ware the weight range was limited between -1 and 1, which reduces the number of solutions
a network can converge to during training. The hardware neurons and synapses are also not
the ideal models that can be found in software which the training algorithm cannot directly
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compensate for. Adding extra neurons in the hidden layer also means that some neurons’
output may not be directly related to the output of the network which adds additional noise
to the system. The initial size of the network was determined by trial-and-error until 100%
accuracy could reliably be achieved. Simpler problems such as a 4-bit XOR were tested
to see the increase of neurons that would be needed in the transition from software to
hardware. The degree to which the size of the S-Box network needed to be increased in
hardware could then be found more quickly.
Each individual network had 8 inputs, a layer of 48 hidden neurons and a single output
neuron (8:48:1). The connections of this network are shown in Fig. 4.7. In Fig. 4.7 the
inputs are simply input voltages ranging from−1V to +1V . Each arrow requires a synapse
circuit. The hidden and output layers neurons both require a full neuron circuit. The final
output also has a comparator circuit which converts voltages greater than 0V to 1V and
voltages less than 0V to 0V . This comparator is needed so that this analog neural network










Figure 4.7: The network architecture for a single output oj . There are 8 total networks, one for each
S-box output. The eight inputs are fully connected to the hidden layer of 48 neurons which are in
turn all connected to the output neuron.
An alternative architecture was also designed to add even more randomness to the power
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consumption. Eight networks with 7 inputs and 2 outputs were also trained and used in a
different configuration (7:48:2). Four of the networks were trained assuming the MSB of
the input value was ’0’ and the other four assuming an MSB of ’1.’ Together these networks
can generate the SBox output but only half need to be active at a time. The other half can be




















Figure 4.8: The architecture of the neural network with random values added. The MSB of the input
controls both the multiplexers.
4.4 AES Architecture
The AES implementation operates on an 128-bit key and 128-bit state and was adapted
from the work done in [39]. The unit was designed structurally and consists of a high
level encryption unit, a control block, memory, and blocks which perform the four round
operations. The control block state machine determines when each operation and round is
over and when to read and write to memory. This state machine is shown in Fig. 4.9. AES
requires 10 rounds of execution when using a 128-bit key but this value can be changed by
the control block since only one round is required to mount a DPA attack.
The state diagram shows how in each transformation all 16 bytes of the state are calculated
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sequentially before moving on to the next state. After loading the bytes of the state the Ad-
dRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns transformations are performed before
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count != 15count != 15
Figure 4.9: The state machine which controls the AES algorithm.
In the standard CMOS implementation the SubBytes operation is performed using a simple
lookup table. This implementation is used as a baseline to perform DPA attacks. The pro-
posed neuromemristive architecture uses the presented hardware neural network in place
of the lookup table.
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Chapter 5
Simulation and Attack Framework
This chapter discusses how the proposed architecture was simulated and attacked. In the
simulation stage the architecture is validated for correctness and power traces are extracted.
In the attack stage the power traces are processed along with the input data to the simula-
tion.
5.1 Simulation Framework
5.1.1 AES Encryption Unit
The AES encryption unit was written in System-Verilog and the design is compiled and
synthesized to a gate level implementation. The simulation is controlled by a testbench
which specifies the input data, rounds of execution, and number of executions. A random
plaintext is generated for every execution. Only the first round of the AES algorithm is sim-
ulated since attacks on subsequent rounds cannot be performed without knowing the secret
key. Several thousand execution iterations of AES are needed to perform a successful DPA
attack and power data from these iterations is gathered during a single simulation.
This simulation flow uses Synopsys tools for the compilation, synthesis, simulation, and
power extraction of the design. The compilation and systhesis steps are shown in Fig.
5.1. The source files for the AES encryption unit are compiled together with the target
implementation library using the Synopsys Design Compiler. The output is a single Verilog
file that contains the gate-level implementation of AES.
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The simulation and power extraction steps are also shown in Fig. 5.1. The compiled gate-
level netlist and the testbench are fed as inputs to Synopsys Verilog Compiler Simulator













Figure 5.1: The source file and testbench are simulated and both the simulation outputs and power
at each step of execution are gathered.
The outputs from VCS and PrimeTime are a .out and .txt file. The .out file contains the
power consumption of the design for every event that occured during simulation. The
timestamp in this file has a resolution of .01 ns. The .txt file contains the start time of each
individual encryption along with the input plaintext and the output ciphertext. In this case
the ciphertext is not a valid AES encrpytion output since only one round was executed, not
ten. With these two files a DPA attack can be ran.
5.1.2 Neural Network
The neural network which performs the SubBytes operation was implemented in HSPICE.
First the individual components of the design such as neurons and synapses were simulated
independently and validated for correctness. The actual network itself was generated us-
ing a Python script which combined the individual components into a full network. This
network is then validated to ensure it has the correct output values for every input combi-
nation. This process can be seen in Fig. 5.2. First the network is prototyped in Matlab
and weight information is exported to a Python script. The Python script then generates
the network and simulates every input combination through HSPICE. The outputs are then
read out from a measurement file and the performance is checked in Matlab. If the net-
work accuracy is less than 100% the network has go through further training iterations. If
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Figure 5.2: The process used to generate and test a hardware neural network.
The power data extracted from the HSPICE model had a resolution of .01 ns to match the
resolution from PrimeTime. The two sets of power data can then be combined together to
find the total consumption of the circuit.
5.2 Attack Framework
The attack framework has two main inputs, the power traces and the plaintext informa-
tion. The DPA algorithm uses instantaneous power consumption of the system when the
secret key was being used. Therefore, the algorithm first has to extract the relevant power
consumption values from the supplied power trace files.
The particular operation being targeted in this attack is the S-Box lookup in the first round.
Equation 5.1 shows the equation that represents this operation. In the case of a first round
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attack only the plaintext is known. The Key byte has 256 possible values and this value is
what the attack is attempting to guess.
ByteOuti = SBox[Plaintexti ⊕Keyi] (5.1)
This operation will occur at a particular offset away from the start of the encryption. The
calculation of ByteOut0 occurs first, then ByteOut1 and so on. Since the start time of
each encryption is known the algorithm simply has to go through the power trace data until
it arrives at the correct timestamp. Once the power trace for a particular operation has
been found it is then sorted into a low or high bin depending on the particular key guess.
There are 256 pairs of bins, one pair for each key guess. If the ByteOut resulting from a
particular key guess has more ’1’ bits than a threshold value then the trace is put into the
high bin. Otherwise it is put into the low bin.
Once all the power traces have been sorted the average power consumption in each bin
is found. The differential trace for each key guess is the difference in power between the
high and low bin. If a particular key guess was correct, the differential trace for that guess
will be greater than the differential trace for all other key guesses. The confidence ratio
[40] is a metric for determining the likelihood a key guess is correct and is defined as the
maximum differential trace divided by the next highest differential trace. A confidence ratio
of 1 means that a key guess is not likely to be correct, and the confidence ratio generally
increases as the number of traces gathered increases for a successful attack. The expression





This framework was developed in Matlab. Once all of the necessary power traces have
been found they can be sorted in parallel since the computation for a particular key guess
is independent of all other key guesses. In the case of pure CMOS implementation the
power traces are already in one file. When collecting power traces for the CMOS and
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hardware neural network architecture the traces from both power collection methods have
to be combined by matching timestamps. Once they are combined into one file the attack
process is the same. The process is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. In this attack 8 bits are guessed at
a time so the Predict Byte Output step requires 256 predictions. Each of those predictions
need to be sorted independently so there are a total of 256 ’0’ bins and 256 ’1’ bins for
each partial guess. Since there are 128 bits in the key there are a total of 16 partial guesses
required to guess the entire key. Even if the attacker cannot correctly guess every key byte











Key guesses with 
confidence ratios
Figure 5.3: The attack process is implemented using Matlab scripts which take power and simulation




6.1 Neuron and Synapse Tests
A critical component of a neural network’s ability to learn difficult functions is its activation
function. A linear activation function is only able to learn linearly separable functions and
is therefore unsuitable for the S-Box function. Instead a sigmoidal function was used that
approximates the hyberbolic tangent function. A true hyperbolic tangent function is not
necessary since problems such as a limited input range can be compensated for by the
training process. Fig. 6.1 shows the simple framework used to test the synapse and neuron
together. The weight values range from -1 to 1, and the input magnitude is generally swept
to capture the full range of the activation function.
HSPICE
Synapse NeuronWeight ValueInput Magnitude Output Value
Figure 6.1: The framework used to test the neuron and synapse circuits.
The sigmoid function generated by the neuron circuit is compared to an ideal sigmoid in
Fig. 6.2. This plot was generated using a synapse weight value of 1 and the input magnitude
was swept from -0.5V to 0.5V . The ideal sigmoid clearly has a shallower slope and ap-
proaches its output limits more gradually. The circuit also has a more limited output range
since its inputs range from -0.5V to 0.5V but the output is limited to -.35V to .4V . The
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changes from the ideal sigmoid make it impossible for network weights to be transferred
directly from software to hardware without losing some accuracy. In some applications a
small loss of accuracy might be permitted, but in the case of the AES S-Box 100% accu-
racy is required. Even adjusting the models when training in software to mimic what is
found in hardware led to little improvement in training results. One way the accuracy can
be improved is by using extra neurons in the hidden layer so that the hardware could have
an easier time converging to 100% accuracy.






















Figure 6.2: The ideal sigmoid shape and output measured from the neuron circuit.
The synapse circuits also had to be evaluated to ensure a wide range of weight values were
available. Fig. 6.3 shows a few possible weight values. Both positive and negative weight
values are shown. These weight values are selected by putting one memristor in its high
resistance (off) state and adjusting the other memristor to the desired weight. For positive
weight values the negative resistor is off and the opposite is true for negative weight values.
A synapse weight of zero is made by turning both memristors off. There is still a small
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negative output even with a synapse weight of zero but this is compensated for during
training.
















Figure 6.3: An example of different synapse weight values and their effect on the sigmoid activation
function output.
6.2 DPA Attack Results
Three architectures were evaluated to determine their resistance to DPA. These architec-
tures are shown in Table 6.1.
Architecture S-Box Implementation
CMOS CMOS LUT
CMOS + 8:48:1 ANN 8 × 8:48:1 ANN
CMOS + 7:48:2 ANN 8 × 7:48:2 ANN
Table 6.1: The architectures attacked using DPA.
The first system tested was the full CMOS system. This implementation was not resilient
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to DPA which can be seen in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5. Fig. 6.4 shows the difference between
the A0 and A1 bins as more traces are gathered. Each line corresponds to a key guess,
so this figure only shows the guesses for one byte of the key. One differential trace is
clearly higher than all the rest which becomes apparent after only a few hundred traces are
gathered.





















Figure 6.4: The differential traces for different guesses of the first byte of the key in a fully CMOS
architecture.
Fig. 6.5 shows the confidence ratio for every key byte. After only 2000 traces are gath-
ered the confidence ratio is above 2.0 for every byte. Each corresponding key guess was
also determined to be correct. This shows that the CMOS architecture is clearly not se-
cure against DPA. Multiple trials showed that the key bytes could consistently be guessed
correctly without requiring an infeasible number of power traces. These attacks were done
using a Hamming Weight leakage model.
Next the CMOS architecture using a hardware neural network for the S-Box function was
tested using the same number of power traces. The power consumption of the neural net-
work for every input combination is shown in Fig. 6.6. This data was collected from eight
eight-input, one-output networks. The power consumption of the network is clearly related
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Figure 6.5: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the fully CMOS architecture.
to the input value of the network. There are nine distinct power levels which correspond
to 0-8 input bits being high. This means that the power consumption of the network is not
dependent on the S-Box output value which implies it will not be vulnerable to DPA.




















Figure 6.6: The power consumption of the network for every input combination.
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Retraining the network also changes the overall power signature for each input value. In
Fig. 6.7a the power consumption of two different networks are plotted together. In Fig.
6.7b just the difference in power consumption is plotted. The overall consumption is dom-
inated by the input value, but the change of network weights still has some effect.




















(a) The power consumption of two different 8:48:1
neural networks for every input combination.



























(b) The difference in power consumption of two dif-
ferent 8:48:1 neural networks for every input combi-
nation.
In Fig. 6.8 it can be seen that no single differential trace was clearly higher across all
the key byte guesses. This can be confirmed by looking at the confidence ratios in Fig.
6.9. After 2000 traces no confidence ratio is consistently above 1.4 and no successful key
guesses were made.
The neural network architecture using random input values was also evaluated over 2000
traces. As expected, this architecture performs as well as the previous neural network
architecture for 2000 traces. In Fig. 6.10 no differential trace is clearly higher and in Fig.
6.11 there are no confidence ratios above 1.4.
The neural network architectures are clearly more resilient than the pure CMOS implemen-
tation. However, a true attack may use several thousand more traces so next the networks
were tested using 40,000 power traces. Figs. 6.12 6.13 shows the results of an attack using
40,000 power traces. Even with that many traces the attack cannot successfully recover a
single key byte. All of the confidence ratios remained below 1.2 after some initial spikes in
the beginning.
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Figure 6.8: The differential traces for different guesses of the first byte of the key in a CMOS with
the 8:48:1 neural network architecture.

















Figure 6.9: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the CMOS with the 8:48:1 neural network
architecture.
Next the neuromemristive systems were attacked using a Hamming Distance leakage model.
This attack was more effective in that seven key bytes were correctly guessed. Despite these
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Figure 6.10: The differential traces for different guesses of the first byte of the key in a CMOS with
the 7:48:2 neural network architecture with randomization.


















Figure 6.11: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the CMOS with the 7:48:2 neural network
architecture with randomization.
correct guesses the confidence ratio did not exceed 1.1 after 40,000 power traces as shown
in Fig. 6.14a. In order to prevent the attacker from having any correct key guesses the
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Figure 6.12: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the CMOS with the 8:48:1 neural network
architecture after 40,000 power traces.


















Figure 6.13: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the CMOS with the 7:48:2 neural network
architecture after 40,000 power traces.
network was retrained after 20,000 power traces to change its power signature. Fig. 6.14b
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shows the confidence ratios changed slightly after retraining but all of the key guesses re-
mained the same. This shows that the randomness gained from retraining the network is not
large enough to completely disrupt an attack after a large number of samples have already
been taken.
















(a) The confidence ratios with the 8:48:1 neural
network architecture with a Hamming Distance
leakage model.
















(b) The confidence ratios with the 8:48:1 neural
network architecture with weight retraining.
An attack on the 7:48:2 architecture with the Hamming Distance leakage model was unable
to successfully guess any key bytes. The confidence trace for this attack is shown in Fig.
6.15. No confidence traces were consistently above 1.1. The random inputs to the network
were therefore able to stop this DPA attack.
The strong effect the input values have on the network power consumption may make it
possible to attack the AddRoundKey transformation rather than the SubBytes transforma-
tion. In practice, the SubBytes transformation is attacked because it is non-linear which
makes it more vulnerable to DPA [20]. However, this neuromemristive implementation
was attacked at the AddRoundKey stage regardless to ensure its safety against DPA. As
expected, the system withstood an attack after 40,000 power traces without any confidence
ratio above 1.1 and no correct key guesses. The confidence traces from this attack are
shown in Fig. 6.16
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Figure 6.15: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the CMOS with the 7:48:2 neural network
architecture after 40,000 power traces and a Hamming Distance leakage model.


















Figure 6.16: The confidence ratios for all key bytes from the CMOS with the 8:48:1 neural network
architecture after 40,000 power traces attacking the AddRoundKey stage.
The main drawback of this neuromemristive implementation is its power and area con-
sumption. With the pure CMOS implementation the AES circuit consumed power on the
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order of approximately 10 mW. The power consumption of the neural network itself is on
the order of 100 mW when producing a value. There are several factors which contribute
to this high power consumption. One is that the network was designed using the 180 nm
techonology node, while the CMOS library used for the AES design was at 120 nm. The
size of the networks also is quite large. Table 6.2 shows the number of transistors and
memristors needed to implement the neuron and synapse components. The overall number
of components needed for different S-Box designs is shown in Table 6.3. The CMOS LUT




Table 6.2: The size of neuromemristive components.
S-Box Design Neurons Synapses Transistors Memristors
8 8:48:1 Networks 392 3456 11224 6912
8 7:48:2 Networks 400 3456 11312 6912
CMOS LUT - - 12288 -
Table 6.3: The size of different S-Box designs.
Overheads such as addressing logic and bias current sources were ignored when computing
these values. Although the CMOS and neuromemristive designs use similar numbers of
transistors, the neuromemristive design is analog and its transistors spend more time in the
switching region. The relatively huge power cost of the neuromemristive design could be
mitigated by power gating it when it is not in use since all of its ”memory” is stored in
non-volatile memristors.
Another technique to use memristors to mitigate DPA was proposed by Khedkar [16]. In
this approach RRAM was used to balance the power consumption of memory accesses.
Using RRAM instead of SRAM for all the memory greatly reduced the average power of
an AES encryption from 8 mW to 2 mW. The implementation was also resistant to DPA
even after 40,000 traces had been gathered.
An adaptive masking technique was used by Smith [39] to protect AES from DPA. The
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masking approach protected the AES implementation over 50,000 traces without a single
correct key guess. The masking technique had small area and power overheads.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis work proposed a technique to mitigate DPA using a neuromemristive architec-
ture. A framework for building ANNs in hardware was designed using a combination of
Matlab and Python. This framework was then used to train an ANN to compute the Sub-
Bytes transformation in AES. The power profile of these ANNs increased the resilience
of AES to DPA compared to a baseline implementation. Synopsys tools were used to ex-
tract power consumption from the baseline AES implementation and HSPICE was used
to simulate and extract power from the ANNs. An attack framework was created in Mat-
lab which could run DPA attacks in parallel. This attack framework was verified to work
against a pure CMOS AES implementation and then used against the neuromorphic archi-
tecture.
The attack framework was able to correctly guess all key bytes of the baseline CMOS
implementation in less than 2000 power traces. DPA was less effective against the neu-
romemristive architectures. In the case of a Hamming Weight leakage model the proposed
design was able to withstand attacks that used 40,000 power traces. When a Hamming
Distance leakage model was used the network architecture without any additional random-
ization had several of its key bytes guessed correctly but not with a high confidence ratio.
Also, retraining the network to change its power signature while it was being attacked had
a minimal effect on the key guesses. The power consumption of the proposed countermea-
sure was up to 10x higher than the total system power even though it had a similar number
55
of transistors. However, neuromemristive architectures show potential in mitigating DPA
attacks without having to explicitly apply masking and hiding techniques.
7.2 Future Work
One important part of hardware neural networks that this work did not investigate was the
feasibility of actual on-chip training. Training a neural network in hardware is a difficult
problem that was not fully addressed and a comparison between hardware and software
training algorithms valuable to see what is feasible. Memristor fabrication is still in its
infancy and the amount of variation between memristors is large. This implies chip-in-the-
loop training is necessary unless the unique parameters of every memristor can be stored in
software.
While this design was resistant to first order attacks, higher order attacks may be more
effective. Other attacks such as correlation power analysis (CPA) could also be mounted.
Attacks unrelated to power consumption such as timing attacks or hardware trojans present
a similar threat to security.
The field of neural cryptography has yet to be explored using neuromemristive architec-
tures. Although there are no official standards that use neural cryptography, those algo-
rithms are based on neural networks and would be well suited for implementation with the
proposed neuron and synapse designs. The transformations in AES were designed to be ef-
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